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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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James D. Syring—Rear Admiral Syring graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1985 
with a Bachelor of Science degree in marine engineering and was commissioned as an engineering 
duty officer. He completed his Master of Science degree in mechanical engineering from the Naval 
Postgraduate School in 1992. Syring is also a graduate of the Defense Systems Management 
College and a member of the Acquisition Professional Community. 
Syring received his surface warfare officer qualification on board the USS Downes (FF 1070) 
where he served as auxiliaries and electrical officer and subsequently as electronics material officer. 
His engineering duty officer tours include ship superintendent for the USS Port Royal (CG 73) and 
Aegis test officer for new construction DDG 51 class ships on the staff of the supervisor of 
shipbuilding, Pascagoula, 1992–1996; combat systems, test and trials officer in the DDG 51 Aegis 
Shipbuilding Program Office (PMS 400D), 1996–1999; and combat systems baseline manager at the 
Aegis Technical Division, responsible for new construction Aegis baseline computer program 
development, 1999–2001. Syring served as director for surface combatants, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), where he advised the secretary on 
all acquisition matters related to CG 47, DDG 51, DDG 1000, and LCS class ships from 2001 until 
2003. His next assignment was as the technical director for the DDG 1000 Shipbuilding Program, 
serving in that capacity until 2005. 
Most recently, Syring served as program manager for the U.S. Navy’s DDG 1000 Program 
(2005–2010). As program manager, he was responsible for total ship systems engineering and 
acquisition of DDG 1000 and associated technologies, including integrated power systems, dual band 
radar, and the advanced gun system. Syring currently serves as the program executive officer for 
Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS). 
Syring’s personal awards include the Legion of Merit (two awards), the Meritorious Service Medal 
(four awards), Navy Commendation Medal, and Navy Achievement Medal. 
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Competition and the DoD Marketplace 
Nickolas H. Guertin—Mr. Guertin is the director for transformation in the Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation. He has extensive 
experience in Open Systems Architecture product development for weapons, sensors, and ship 
systems. He also has expertise in ship construction and repair. He leads the transformation of 
business, technical, and cultural practices for OSA acquisition of national security systems as a 
coordinated Naval Enterprise effort. He also leads the chartered Department of Defense OSA and 
Data Rights Team supporting the Better Buying Power initiative. [nickolas.h.guertin@navy.mil] 
Brian Womble—Mr. Womble is the deputy for open architecture in the Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation. He spent the first half of his 
career working as a system developer in the telecommunications industry in Dallas, TX. In 2001, Mr. 
Womble joined Lockheed Martin in Manassas, VA, on Open Architecture efforts within the U.S. Navy 
Submarine ARCI program. He joined the Navy civilian workforce in 2009 and is now leading efforts to 
transition the Naval Enterprise to Open Systems Architecture through an Open Business Model. 
[brian.womble@navy.mil] 
Abstract 
The looming budget crisis brings opportunity for improving acquisition performance. Major 
Department of Defense (DoD) budget cuts are certain, creating an even greater need to rein 
in costs. From almost every vantage point—including ship, aircraft, space-ground system 
development, military construction, modernization, and sustainment—acquisition costs have 
escalated (Ewing, 2012). A new strategy is needed to drive down costs, spur innovation, and 
improve acquisition performance. It is these authors’ belief that by using an Open Business 
Model, Open Systems Architecture practices, and simultaneously creating a competitive 
marketplace, the DoD can significantly reduce the impact of the coming budget cuts. This 
paper identifies the general aspects of an alternative acquisition model. We will report a 
relevant example of success that had dramatically better acquisition performance than the 
current one and will discuss how the DoD can transition to this model to avert the coming 
crisis for the U.S. DoD Enterprise. 
Introduction 
The looming budget crisis brings opportunity for improving acquisition performance. 
Major Department of Defense (DoD) budget cuts are certain, creating an even greater need 
to rein in costs. From almost every vantage point—including ship, aircraft, space-ground 
system development, military construction, modernization, and sustainment—acquisition 
costs have escalated (Ewing, 2012). A new strategy is needed to drive down costs, spur 
innovation, and improve acquisition performance. It is these authors’ belief that by using an 
Open Business Model, Open Systems Architecture practices, and simultaneously creating a 
competitive marketplace, the DoD can significantly reduce the impact of the coming budget 
cuts.  
This paper identifies the general aspects of an alternative acquisition model. We will 
report a relevant example of success that had dramatically better acquisition performance 
than the current one and will discuss how the DoD can transition to this model to avert the 
coming crisis for the U.S. DoD Enterprise. 
Transforming the DoD Enterprise 
In the 1990s the Navy’s submarine program was in a similar crisis, with escalating 
costs, inflation, and lagging technical superiority. The aggressive acquisition decisions made 
in the face of a reduced budget and an increasingly capable threat have been well 
documented (Guertin & Miller, 1998). From this early crucible, the Navy created the Acoustic 
Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program, which still thrives today. Several key decisions that 
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drove its success involved reducing systems to smaller, separately acquirable components; 
increasing the number of industry participants; applying common products across several 
platforms; and using competition to increase access to innovation. 
The problems that faced the submarine program then are now being realized across 
the naval portfolio and, for that matter, in the rest of the Armed Services. The DoD can build 
on the Navy’s past successes and fundamentally change the defense acquisition landscape 
using this tested and proven model. The challenge is to enlighten the DoD’s corps of 
program managers to the alternative model and to strategically exercise acquisition choices 
with a well-crafted plan.  
Crafting a Marketplace 
To create more acquisition choices, we must operate with an Open Business Model 
that allows more defense contractors to participate in our efforts, using periodic competitions 
to keep prices low and innovation flowing. Open Systems Architecture will be mandated in 
our designs to facilitate loose coupling and high cohesion. 
A sound technical foundation is necessary, including technical standards, interfaces, 
and cyclical updates that are controlled and managed to serve the government’s best 
interests. In this model, contractors are rewarded for ethical behavior, outstanding products, 
and superior performance. Competition will incentivize on-time deliveries, innovation, and 
continuing production efficiencies while driving prices lower. The marketplace must be fair 
and even-handed and provide incentives for higher profits through cost reduction. Negative 
incentives are uniformly and justly applied for unethical or destructive behavior. A sound 
understanding of how and where to level the competitive playing field is critical to 
constructing and managing an Open Business Model to achieve desired goals. 
What Makes a Marketplace Successful 
Free Flow of Information 
The power of the Internet revolution is not the computers, switches, software, and 
infrastructure that form what we refer to as “the Internet.” The power is in the information 
that is delivered to the end user. The Internet is a positive tool in providing decision criteria 
that can allow a contractor to extract the best from its resources and help the DoD get the 
best products for the best prices at the right time. 
Property Rights and Protections  
Respecting contractors’ copyrights as documented in the FAR and DFARs 
regulations displays important support by the government program manager for the fairness 
of the marketplace. Program managers will assert government data rights through contracts 
and must use care to manage program deliveries. When time for a periodic competition 
nears, selective data will be made available to qualified bidders, allowing prospective 
contractors a fair chance to win the new contract. 
Trust Between Participants 
In a research and development (R&D) program, there are numerous opportunities for 
participants to violate trust. Faithfully reporting faults or bugs, delivering on time, and 
honestly reporting completion status are examples of good behavior. Participants also rely 
on government program managers to be fair and benevolent judges for enforcing 
marketplace rules (judging performance equitably, not playing favorites among participants, 
etc.). In a marketplace, trust is especially needed in transactions that take a relatively long 
time to complete, a condition native to an R&D project. 
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Competition 
Competition works for the DoD because sellers are rewarded by securing a contract 
when lowering their prices and bringing desirable, less expensive, new ideas to the 
marketplace. On markets, author-economist John McMillan (2002) says, “Competition sets 
prices right, inducing resources to flow to their highest-value uses. It disciplines those 
competing to operate efficiently. It generates information about demands and supplies. It 
brings lower transaction costs than the alternative of case-by-case bargaining does. 
Creating the conditions for active competition is one of the main tasks of market design.” 
Competition thins any one participant’s ability to exercise power over the marketplace and 
prevents one party from having a decisive effect on the overall marketplace.  
Negative Consequences  
One danger in designing a marketplace is to overlook negative consequences 
relative to overall design. An example is a market where only current contract holders are 
allowed to participate, a situation that can contribute to vendor lock and escalating prices. 
The marketplace is affected by technical conditions as well, such as cases where proprietary 
“special” tools are allowed to be used for code generation or other development activities 
and are not made available to other competing bidders. Proprietary data-modeling tools fall 
into this category. Another example involves unintended consequences that occur through 
overzealous application of the government data rights, which could cool innovation and drive 
out financially weaker partners.  
Governance 
Transaction costs represent inefficiencies in the marketplace, accompanied by risk. 
Risk increases overall costs, which are borne by the customer (ultimately, the government). 
Part of governance is to make sure that all activities, rules, and regulations are necessary, 
applied evenly, and reduce transaction costs such that free trade is encouraged. 
A Level Playing Field 
All programs seek the best possible performance at the most affordable cost. The 
most effective mechanism to get quality products and lowest prices is to facilitate and 
cultivate an open, competitive marketplace. For a government program manager, this is 
good business sense. Typically, our performance demands are unique in that there are few 
pure commercially available goods that meet our needs. We are a unique buyer for things 
that must be uniquely crafted. The market we buy from has a relatively small number of 
suppliers (defense firms). There is no “invisible hand” (Smith, 1776) that will fill our demands 
for the goods we desire. Competition is the most effective means to the lowest price, while 
simultaneously improving performance and increasing design robustness. The logic flow in 
Figure 1 lays out the decision process steps to establish and maintain an open, competitive 
DoD marketplace. 
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Figure 1. Open Systems Architecture and Data Rights Drive Acquisition 
Performance 
Fielded programs have already completed initial development and are in the 
sustainment phase; many have needs for improvements. As a matter of practice, it takes 
several years and substantial cost to develop a completely new platform or weapon, but it 
takes relatively minor investments to make incremental upgrades. Upgrade programs have 
historically been driven by specific platform architectures and are usually tightly coupled with 
the original platform vendor. Imagine developing a whole new aircraft or competing for all 
aspects of a ship weapon system just to upgrade a component. Competition for product 
improvements is far more efficient at the component level and is the most risk-prudent 
approach for making changes to our existing inventory of military equipment. 
Introducing competition in long-running programs can be challenging. Platform 
unique architectures that were conceived and delivered via a platform-focused contractor 
tend not to lend themselves to quickly or easily integrating capabilities from outside (third-
party) sources. To begin solving this problem, systems engineering skills in both government 
and industry must be learned to facilitate necessary changes to system architectures in 
accommodating new components.  
Another crucial element to competition is ensuring that it is possible for a non-
incumbent to win. Conversely, competition is real only when it is possible for the incumbent 
to lose. All bidders to a request for proposal (RFP) must have access to the right information 
that will level the intellectual playing field and facilitate the ability for any qualified vendor to 
bid and win. This highlights two problems that the government must solve: (1) what is the 
minimum set of information that should be made available and (2) how can it be shared with 
minimal risk? The government must be strategic in releasing information delivered from its 
incumbent contractor to ensure that critical artifacts are shared at the right time and place, 
commensurate to facilitating competition over the product’s life cycle. Program managers 
and resource sponsors must be aware of the value of requesting those deliverables in the 
contract and must demand delivery so that the data is available when needed.  
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Once the needed data and information have been identified and delivered, how can 
the government ensure that they are subsequently sharable? For the vast majority of the 
military warfighting systems we have procured in the past, the government has paid for all or 
part of the development. When the government pays for development, license rights are 
conveyed by regulations and statute. Under appropriate circumstances, the government can 
share intellectual property across the vendor community. Although the government has long 
had these rights to data, it has not often effectively asserted them, nor has it requested the 
minimum data needed to ensure life cycle competition. This is certainly one of the reasons 
that so many programs are vendor locked. Understanding the government’s rights in each 
piece of data, both technical data and computer software, is a behavior that must become 
automatic across the acquisition community, especially in new start programs, so that 
competition can be established and sustained. The DoD OSA Contract Guidebook for 
Program Managers (DoD, 2011)is an excellent resource for program office staff to use to 
help ensure that the critical elements of a system are captured during the design and 
production phase.  
The government has two main fiduciary responsibilities: (1) get the best product for 
the warfighter and (2) get the best deal for the taxpayer. Systems engineering skills, 
program management practices, and acquisition acumen must be improved to meet this 
challenge. 
To put competition into integrated systems, the program manager should divide a 
large acquisition into smaller business units that are just large enough to be worth the time 
and effort to compete (on both the government’s and industry’s sides), yet small enough to 
be managed as a module that can be developed with workable autonomy (loosely coupled). 
Opportunities exist for bringing in a variety of smaller components that can replace or 
provide additional items that are needed by the warfighter.  
Engaging Resource Sponsors 
With new budget constraints, sponsor organizations are beginning to see the value 
of having common systems that can be used across many platforms. Additional 
arrangements to work out the details and plans for system development and production 
sharing efforts are required to make strides into combining program resources. The practice 
of coordinating sponsor investments can and must become part of the Enterprise funding 
model, thus finding a way to merge “similar” systems into “common” product lines 
paramount (Guertin & Clements, 2010). Reuse of completed, tested, and certified systems 
must be the norm for the way forward. 
Integrator or Application Developer  
Separating roles in system research and development contracts will help preserve a 
competitive environment. There is a fundamental conflict of interest in our classic 
arrangement of having the prime integrator also be the application developer. This flaw 
precludes having a market of component providers from a variety of firms. In this case, the 
integrators are profit-motivated to keep the work that is most desirable in-house and 
relegate the less desirable and less profitable tasks to others. It would be healthier for the 
marketplace to divide the contract structure such that the integrator is limited to integration. 
The role of the applications developer would be contracted to a different entity. Industry 
would then be motivated to enforce modularity and well-defined system interfaces to create 
healthy, stand-alone components with low coupling and high cohesion. The “prime” fills a 
mentoring role as a business partner whose main function is to ensure that the resulting 
design is open and supports continuous competition across the life cycle for capability 
improvements. Figure 2 illustrates this concept. There are also hard-won lessons learned 
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from other defense acquisitions that attempted to establish these market forces that can be 
captured and applied to this DoD Enterprise acquisition model (Yakovac, 2007).The most 
important requirement is to ensure that component products go through a rigorous validation 
and verification stage before being promotable to integration. 
 
Figure 2. Common Product Lines and Component Integration Into Systems and 
Platforms 
Commonality and Just-in-Time Contracting 
Contracting organizations are already under heavy workloads. There are two 
mechanisms that will greatly simplify the DoD’s contracting workload for warfighting product 
R&D and increase our ability to gain greater cost performance from our investments. The 
first is to strategically reuse common products, based on best Enterprise value. This will 
decrease the number of contracts required. The second is to capture the contracting tactics 
used successfully by programs that are achieving the benefits of OSA and make those 
tactics more repeatable. We propose that the DoD establish a small number of contract 
templates (e.g., platform integrator, system integrator, component provider, hardware 
integrator, and independent test agent), based on the highly successful DoD OA Contract 
Guidebook for Program Managers (DoD, 2011). Using these templates, the DoD can 
increase clarity in our business strategy and use consistent contract incentives to achieve 
well-defined goals and speed the delivery of contract actions. This will decrease the inherent 
complexity with creating unique and uncoordinated contracts for very similar types of work. 
These changes will offset the need to increase the number of contracts used in a typical 
development in order to resolve the inherent conflict of interest associated with being both 
an integrator and a component developer. A key benefit of creating this tiered structure is to 
decompose our systems development projects into smaller contracts that are inherently 
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more efficient and effective at meeting cost and schedule requirements (The Standish 
Group International, 1999). Another benefit of this approach is that contracts typically take 
years to prepare and compete. Most of them are unique ground-up compositions that are 
tailored for particular programs and particular platforms. Unique contracts result in poor 
communications from the government to industry, especially in addressing a clear 
government business strategy.  
Government Roles 
In order to realize the changes discussed in this paper, the DoD must lead. Definition 
and structure must be dictated for a new DoD marketplace. Participants should understand 
what their rights (use and ownership) are with regards to intellectual property. A sense of 
fairness should pervade the marketplace, with the spirit of healthy competition and respect 
at all levels for legal and ethical behavior. 
Summary 
Slow and costly business and engineering principles of the past have produced a 
situation in which the DoD will soon not be able to support its warfighters with adequate 
materiel solutions. We must take advantage of work and progress that has been achieved 
by reusing proven solutions. Difficulties in contracting must be addressed to improve 
throughput so that more businesses can participate and contracts are awarded on a more 
manageable schedule. Delegating specific roles for integrators and application developers 
would help maintain a competitive and fair environment. Ultimately, the marketplace is 
crafted by the contract language, and as such, that language must incentivize Open 
Systems Architecture behavior. Introducing mandatory contract templates can help correct 
issues that exist with our program-specific contracts. 
Finally, the submarine program of the 1990s is an example of success, which 
continues today to save taxpayer dollars using an Open Systems Architecture acquisition 
model. The path is to transform the DoD marketplace, create an atmosphere of reuse, and 
use Open Systems Architecture to deliver best value to the warfighter. 
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